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Mortgage Foreclosure Prevention Efforts
Kristopher Gerardi and Wenli Li*
In 2007, the United States began to experience its worst housing and foreclosure 
crisis since the Great Depression. In response, policymakers have been devising 
foreclosure prevention plans, most of which focus on loan modifications.
This article begins with an overview of the different loss mitigation tools that 
mortgage lenders and policymakers have used in the past to combat foreclosure 
and then briefly summarizes the main U.S. programs of the past few years. By 
most analyses, the authors note, these recent programs have had poor results in 
terms of significantly reducing foreclosures, and borrowers who have received 
modifications are redefaulting at extremely high rates.
The authors then review both the theoretical academic literature of the 
1990s and early 2000s and the more recent empirical literature generated by 
the recent foreclosure crisis. Many of the recent studies have focused on loan 
modification as a loss mitigation tool. 
Given the limited success of government loan modification programs, 
the authors believe that policymakers will likely turn their attention to other 
alternatives. The authors point to signs that the focus is now shifting to programs 
that do not attempt to prevent foreclosures but rather try to help homeowners 
who have already experienced foreclosure.
JEL classification: D11, D12, G21
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1
I
n response to the housing and foreclosure crisis that began in 2007, the worst such crisis since 
the Great Depression, policymakers have had to spend much of their time devising plans to 
prevent foreclosures. While there have been numerous plans to date, and each has its own unique 
aspects, virtually all of them have focused on loan modifications. A loan modification involves 
changing the terms of the mortgage contract in such a way as to lower the borrower’s monthly 
mortgage payment and, in some cases, to also lower the amount of principal owed. 
The motivation for such loan workouts is the observation that foreclosure costs are large 
for virtually all market participants. From the borrower’s perspective, a mortgage default and 
subsequent foreclosure has a severe adverse impact on future access to mortgage and nonmortgage 
credit,  is  disruptive  to  household  stability  because  of  the  mental  anguish  that  results  from 
eviction, and results in the household’s incurring potentially large moving costs. From the lender’s 
perspective, a foreclosure often entails incurring maintenance and tax obligations, transaction 
costs associated with liquidating the property, and mortgage losses to the extent that the sale 
price falls short of the unpaid mortgage balance. Finally, from a social perspective, a few studies 
have found some support for the existence of negative externalities from clusters of foreclosures, 
including depressed market values of surrounding properties.1 On the other hand, the perceived 
costs of providing loan workouts in the form of modifications is generally small compared to these 
foreclosure costs. For example, a study by White (2009) compared the average foreclosure loss 
experienced by lenders to the amount of the average principal reduction and concluded that there 
was significant room for increased modification activity: 
The  average  loss  for  the  21,000  first  mortgages  liquidated  in  November  was  $145,000, 
representing an average loss of 55% of the amount due. Losses on second lien mortgages were 
close to 100%. In comparison, for the modified loans with some amount of principal or interest 
written off, the average loss recognized was $23,610.... This seven-to-one difference between 
foreclosure losses and modification write-offs is striking, and lies at the heart of the failure 
of the voluntary mortgage modification program. Particularly for foreclosed loans with losses 
above the 57% average, some of which approach 100%, the decisions of servicers to foreclose 
is mystifying.... At a minimum, there is room for servicers to be more generous in writing down 
debt for the loans they are modifying, while still recovering far more than from foreclosures in 
the depressed real estate market of late 2008. (White 2009, 14)
Such observations have been the motivation behind the vast majority of foreclosure loss 
mitigation programs. These programs, which we describe in some detail below, have attempted 
to fix the perceived market frictions that impede efficient levels of modification activity. One of 
the most widely cited frictions is a variety of institutional factors related to the collection and 
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sale of mortgages into mortgage-backed securities (MBSs).2 Those who blame securitization for 
extremely low levels of modification activity argue that the incentives of the servicers (the firms 
that collect mortgage payments on behalf of the MBS investors) have become decoupled from 
the group that ultimately bears the losses entailed from foreclosure, the investors. Many of these 
programs have tried to mitigate such incentive problems in the hopes of increasing modification 
levels and lowering the number of foreclosures that have plagued the housing market and the 
economy in general. 
However, while the results have varied across the different loan modification programs, none 
of them have been able to appreciably stop the rising tide of foreclosures in U.S. housing markets. 
For example, RealtyTrac reported in its Midyear 2009 U.S. Foreclosure Market Report that 
one in 84 housing units received at least one foreclosure filing in the first half of the year, which 
amounted to approximately 1.5 million foreclosure filings.3 Commentators have pointed to various 
explanations for the failure of these foreclosure prevention efforts, and in this document, we survey 
the available evidence to try to provide some insight on the topic. In particular, we turn to the 
academic literature (and, to a lesser extent, literature from the mortgage industry) to see what, if 
anything, it has to say about the reasons behind the success or failure of loss mitigation efforts in 
housing markets. The theme that emerges in our analysis is that the process of renegotiating and 
modifying large numbers of mortgages is likely characterized by severe asymmetric information 
issues, which, when properly accounted for, dramatically increase the costs of modifications to 
levels that approach and may even surpass the cost of foreclosures described above. 
This article describes the different tools that mortgage lenders and policymakers have used 
in the past to combat foreclosure and then briefly summarizes the main U.S. policies of the past 
few years. We then review both the theoretical academic literature of the 1990s and early 2000s 
and the more recent empirical literature that the recent foreclosure crisis has spawned. Finally, we 
summarize the lessons learned from the literature and outline characteristics that an effective loss 
mitigation strategy should contain. 
An overview of foreclosure prevention efforts
Loss mitigation tools. While loan modifications are by far the most widely discussed alternative 
to foreclosure, in the current environment, a number of other alternatives have emerged. We 
divide the types of loss mitigation tools into those that allow borrowers to remain in their homes 
and those that do not. For a much more detailed and thorough analysis of loss mitigation tools, we 
direct the reader to Capone (1996). 
There are three types of loss mitigation strategies that allow borrowers to stay in their homes. 
For borrowers with one-time or very short-term difficulties in repayment, the lender will usually 
use a partial repayment strategy whereby the borrower resumes regular monthly payments, plus 
some past-due amount, until the loan becomes current. For borrowers with slightly larger, but 
still short-term, financial troubles, the lender will often provide forbearance. Forbearance is an 
agreement between a lender and a delinquent borrower in which the lender agrees not to foreclose 
for an agreed-upon period of time and the borrower agrees to a mortgage repayment plan that 
will bring the borrower current on his payments by the end of the period.4 After the forbearance 
period, a repayment plan is usually set by the lender that results in the full reinstatement or payoff 
of the mortgage within a specific period of time from the end of the forbearance period. Finally, 
1. The literature on this subject is actually relatively thin. See the companion literature review by Frame (forthcoming).
2. We are referring here to structured nonagency MBSs, as opposed to agency pass-throughs.
3. Foreclosure filings were reported on more than 336,000 U.S. properties in June 2009, which was the fourth straight 
monthly total exceeding 300,000. The second quarter of 2009 showed the highest quarterly total since RealtyTrac began 
issuing its report in the first quarter of 2005.
4. Springer and Waller (1993) explore patterns in the use of forbearance as a loss mitigation tool.3 E C O N O M I C   R E V I E W   Number 2, 2010
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loan modifications, as described above, are a tool that has traditionally been employed to deal with 
borrowers suffering from more permanent types of shocks. 
At least two types of foreclosure alternatives force a borrower to move out of his or her home. 
One such alternative is a preforeclosure sale, or short sale, in which the lender allows the borrower 
to sell the house at a price below the amount owed on the mortgage, inclusive of sale costs and 
other fees. The lender will then either negotiate an unsecured repayment plan with the borrower 
for  the  additional  amount  owed  or  will  forgive  the  remaining  debt  (Cutts  and  Green  2005). 
Another alternative is a deed in lieu of foreclosure, in which a mortgage borrower voluntarily deeds 
collateral property in exchange for a release from all obligations under the mortgage. While both of 
these alternatives involve some of the same costs of foreclosure from the borrower’s perspective, 
including moving costs and mental anguish, they are both usually less costly than foreclosure in 
terms of restricted access to future credit markets. 
While short sale and deed in lieu sound like reasonable alternatives to foreclosure in theory, in 
practice they are used much less often than either forbearance or loan modification. It is difficult 
to pin down exactly why this is the case, but there are several possibilities. First, these two options 
typically  involve  the  lender  forgiving  the  entire  difference  between  the  outstanding  mortgage 
balance and the market value of the property (similar to foreclosure). While in many states it is 
legal for the lender to seek a deficiency judgment for this difference, even in the case of short sale or 
deed in lieu, the lender rarely does so, perhaps because the probability of recovery is so low due to 
the borrower’s weak financial situation.5 Thus, in states with relatively quick foreclosure processes, 
there may not be as much upside to a short sale or deed in lieu because the lender is able to evict the 
borrower and put the house on the market relatively quickly and minimize maintenance and legal 
costs without resorting to these alternatives. But in states where the foreclosure process is very long 
and costly (usually in judicial foreclosure states, where the lender is required to file a lawsuit against 
the borrower in order to foreclose), these two options may be more attractive. Another potential 
complication with a short sale or deed in lieu occurs if the borrower has multiple lenders (second 
liens), in which case all lenders would have to provide their approval.6 
Short sales and deeds in lieu may also have some significant disadvantages from a borrower’s 
perspective.  First,  borrowers  incur  tax  obligations  relating  to  the  forgiveness  of  the  deficiency 
balance. Under federal law, a creditor is required to file a 1099C whenever it forgives a loan balance 
greater than $600. This forgiveness may create a tax liability for the former property owner because 
it is considered “income.”7 Second, there is some evidence that homeowners in financial distress are 
often not interested in voluntarily relinquishing their home and are simply hanging on to their houses 
without any realistic hope of repaying their mortgages (Bahchieva, Wachter, and Warren 2005). 
U.S. policy responses to the recent foreclosure crisis. In response to the rapid rise in 
foreclosures, the U.S. government, along with the industry and industry associations, has sponsored 
a series of programs using loan modifications as an alternative to foreclosure. These programs 
provide additional incentives (often in the form of a subsidy) to lenders, servicers, and borrowers 
for loan modification. The programs can be viewed in two phases marked by the implementation of 
the Obama administration’s Making Home Affordable (MHA) program in March 2009.8 
The mortgage crisis first broke out in the subprime market. To calm that market, Congress 
approved the FHASecure program in September 2007. FHASecure was a temporary initiative 
5. See Ghent and Kudlyak (2009) for a list of recourse versus nonrecourse states. In addition, there is some anecdotal evidence 
that lenders may be pursuing deficiency judgments for more borrowers after agreeing to short sales (Christie 2010).
6. In addition, the decision would also depend on lenders’ expectations of future market conditions. If lenders do not 
expect to fetch much under short sale or deed in lieu, they will have less incentive to speed up the process.
7. The Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 provides tax relief for some loans forgiven in the period 2007 
through 2012.
8. Our writing expands upon Cordell et al. (2009) and Robinson (2009), who also provide an overview of recent government 
loan modification efforts.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA
E C O N O M I C   R E V I E W   Number 2, 2010 4
designed to make it possible for lenders to refinance delinquent adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) 
and/or to offer new subordinate financing in cases where the combined loan-to-value ratio exceeded 
the  applicable  Federal  Housing  Administration  (FHA)  loan-to-value  ratio  and  geographical 
maximum mortgage amount. The program also applied to borrowers who were delinquent on their 
non-FHA ARMs because of a rate reset or the occurrence of “extenuating circumstances.” However, 
the creation of new junior liens equal to the principal forgiven on the original first lien, along with 
a few other complicated features, proved difficult to achieve in practice. By November 2008, only 
4,212 refinancings were made, despite the initial goal of 80,000 
loans. This program was discontinued by the U.S. Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in December 2008. 
In  October  2007,  then-Treasury  Secretary  Henry  Paulson 
announced  the  creation  of  the  Hope  Now  Alliance.  At  its 
inception,  the  alliance  was  composed  of  lenders  representing 
approximately 60 percent of all outstanding mortgages in the 
United  States,  counseling  services,  trade  organizations,  and 
a group representing MBS investors. Additional organizations joined over the following months. 
Hope  Now  describes  the  assistance  that  it  provides  to  homeowners  as  loan  workouts.  These 
workouts can result in establishing either a repayment plan with the homeowner to bring them 
back to current or a permanent loan modification whereby the terms of the mortgage are modified 
in order to make the loan more affordable for the homeowner. Despite the numerous calls received 
at the Homeowners’ Hotline that was set up by Hope Now, the group appeared to be ineffective in 
addressing the increasing problem of foreclosures in the United States. It has also been noted that 
most of the assistance provided by the group has been to establish repayment plans rather than 
actually modify the terms of the mortgage (Zibel 2008). 
On December 6, 2007, Hope Now, working closely with the American Securitization Forum 
and the U.S. Treasury, introduced a fast-track plan to help borrowers avoid interest rate resets. 
Under  the  Streamlined  Foreclosure  and  Loss  Avoidance  Framework,  better  known  as  the 
“Teaser Freezer” plan, mortgage servicers were encouraged to modify mortgages by freezing 
the homeowner’s introductory interest rate for five years. Eligibility for the plan was limited to 
a subgroup of homeowners who acquired their homes using an adjustable-rate subprime loan 
product. Other requirements were that homeowners had to be in relatively good standing on 
their mortgage and were unable to refinance into a fixed-rate or government-insured product. 
It was also necessary that the mortgage cover an owner-occupied property held in a pool of 
securitized mortgages. Using an event-study methodology and focusing on the ABX index—the 
only source of daily security prices in the subprime market—Balla, Carpenter, and Robinson 
(2009) found that investors in the ABX initially perceived that the plan would improve the 
conditions in the subprime market. But the positive effects of the plan were swamped by the 
continued deterioration in the housing market. 
After the failure of IndyMac Federal Savings Bank, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) assumed control of the bank and initiated a modification program for mortgages securitized 
or serviced by IndyMac in August 2008. Under the FDIC Loan Modification Program, or “Mod in 
a Box,” borrowers received a loan modification with a maximum 31 percent housing-to-income 
ratio through the use of interest rate reduction, amortization term extension, and, in some cases, 
principal deferment. The requirements for eligibility were that homeowners must have been at 
least sixty days delinquent on their primary mortgage and must have had a cumulative loan-to-
value (CLTV) ratio greater than 75 percent. Through December 31, 2009, the FDIC had entered 
into eighty-six shared-loss agreements with single-family assets totaling $53.2 billion. 
In the spring of 2008, Congress passed legislation creating the Hope for Homeowners (H4H) 
refinancing program. The program allowed certain borrowers facing difficulty with their mortgages 
to refinance into a new thirty-year or forty-year fixed-rate mortgage insured by the FHA. To be 
Foreclosure loss mitigation 
programs have attempted to fix 
the perceived market frictions 
that impede efficient levels of 
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eligible for the program, the borrower had to be refinancing a mortgage on his or her primary 
residence and could not own any other residential property. Also, the homeowner must have 
had a front-end debt-to-income (DTI) ratio that exceeded a threshold ratio of 31 percent. For 
lenders, H4H required that first-lien holders accept 96.5 percent of the appraised value of the 
home as payment for all outstanding claims. The plan also called for all subordinate liens to be 
extinguished, either by an upfront payment or through a share of the FHA’s take on future house-
price appreciation. The program was not well received because lenders and investors were not 
willing to write down principal. Additionally, servicers complained about the complexity of the 
program, and the mortgage rates offered were relatively high. The program was later revised in the 
Helping Families Save Their Homes Act, signed on May 20, 2009. Among the changes, HUD may 
now permit original lenders or investors to share in any future house-price appreciation in return 
for the required write-down of the current balance. 
In  November  2008,  working  with  Hope  Now,  Fannie  Mae  and  Freddie  Mac  offered  the 
Streamlined Modification Program for loans that they guarantee. Similar to the FDIC’s “Mod in 
a Box” program, the Streamlined Modification Program uses an affordability measure to modify 
mortgages held by government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). To quickly modify mortgages at 
risk of default, the program modifies first liens to reduce the homeowners’ front-end DTI ratio to 
38 percent. The eligibility requirements for the Streamlined Modification Program include that the 
house securing the mortgage must be the homeowner’s primary residence and that a GSE must 
own or have securitized the loan. In addition, only homeowners who are at least ninety days past 
due on their mortgage, have documentation that they encountered some financial hardship, and 
have a combined loan-to-value ratio on their home greater than 90 percent are eligible for the 
program. One important innovation of the Streamlined Modification Program is that it provides an 
$800 incentive payment from the GSEs to the servicers for each mortgage that is modified. The 
Streamlined Program was retired in March 2009. 
The Federal Reserve Board also participated actively in the effort to reduce foreclosures. 
In January 2009, the Federal Reserve Board announced the adoption of the Homeownership 
Preservation Policy, which applies to the residential mortgage assets held by the special-purpose 
vehicles  established  by  the  Federal  Reserve  to  facilitate  the  acquisition  of  Bear  Sterns  by 
JPMorgan Chase and to assist the American International Group Inc. Under the policy, borrowers 
who are sixty days delinquent or are expecting a known trigger event (for example, an interest 
rate reset) or who have recently experienced a decline in income can modify their loans into a 
fixed-rate mortgage for no longer than forty years and with a mortgage debt-to-income ratio of 
38 percent or less. 
The  programs  summarized  above,  by  most  analyses,  have  had  poor  results  in  terms  of 
significantly reducing foreclosures. While the number of concessionary modifications as a fraction 
of seriously delinquent mortgages has recently increased (see Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen 2009), 
they still make up only a very small fraction of delinquent mortgages. Furthermore, borrowers 
that have received modifications are redefaulting at extremely high rates. For example, the Fitch 
ratings service released a report in May 2009 that projected modified loans in subprime pools 
would sour at high rates despite a change in the loan terms. Fitch’s conservative projection was 
that between 65 percent and 75 percent of modified subprime loans would fall sixty days or more 
delinquent within twelve months of the loan change. Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen (2009), using a 
fairly representative U.S. mortgage data set, found that loans modified between the first quarter 
of 2005 and the third quarter of 2008 were characterized by a redefault rate of approximately 50 
percent; for subprime loans the redefault rate was close to 70 percent. 
However, according to both the Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen (2009) study and the 2009 Mortgage 
Metrics Report published by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Office of 
Thrift Supervision (OTS), redefault rates vary substantially depending on the type of modification. 
For example, according to the OCC and OTS report, which analyzed the loan performance at nine FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA
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national banks and four thrifts with the largest mortgage portfolios, “modifications that decreased 
monthly payments had consistently lower redefault rates, with greater percentage decreases [in 
monthly payments] resulting in lower subsequent redefault rates.” The report also found that the 
redefault rate for modified mortgages was generally lower if the borrower’s payment was reduced 
by more than 10 percent.9 
In response to the perceived failure of previous policies to substantially lower foreclosure 
rates, in March 2009 the Obama administration launched a comprehensive initiative called Making 
Home Affordable (MHA) to increase loan modifications through the Home Affordable Modification 
Program  (HAMP)  and  refinances  through  the  Home  Affordable  Refinance  Program  (HARP). 
HAMP requires that all banks and lending institutions that accepted funding from the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (TARP) must implement loan modifications for eligible loans under HAMP’s 
guidelines. For non-TARP banks, participation is voluntary. As in some of the earlier programs 
discussed above, the modifications attempt to target a DTI ratio of 31 percent; however, in order to 
qualify for HAMP, lenders must first reduce payments on mortgages to no greater than a 38 percent 
DTI ratio. The modified interest rate under HAMP will remain in effect for five years. Eligible 
borrowers are those who are current on their mortgage payments but face financial hardship 
or imminent default.10 The program basically comprises two pieces. The first piece is a “trial 
modification” that provides the borrower with a temporarily reduced monthly payment (typically 
for six months). This provision is essentially the same as a forbearance agreement between the 
borrower and the lender. The second piece, which is conditional on a successful trial modification, 
is a permanent modification (either a reduction of the interest rate, extension of the maturity, 
or reduction in the principal balance). According to the Treasury Servicer Performance Report, 
through December 2009 more than 900,000 homeowners had started trial modifications, and more 
than 1 million offers for trial modifications had been extended to borrowers. However, the number 
of permanent modifications has been low by most accounts.11 
Literature review
Theoretical literature. It may be surprising to many to learn that prior to the current crisis, 
there was academic and industry interest in the topic of foreclosure loss mitigation associated with 
residential mortgages. 
Ambrose and Capone (1996) was one of the first studies in the mortgage literature to formalize 
a cost-benefit analysis of the lender’s decision to either foreclose or renegotiate with a delinquent 
borrower. The authors assume that the lender is faced with five alternatives when dealing with a 
seriously delinquent borrower: loan modification, preforeclosure sale, deed in lieu of foreclosure, 
forbearance, or foreclosure. One of the insights that comes out of the paper is the idea that “self-
cure” risk is a very important component of the cost-benefit analysis. Self-cure risk is defined as 
  9. Unfortunately, up to the writing of this paper, we cannot find any information on whether the redefault rate also 
depends on the type of lender that initiated the modification. In particular, it may be interesting to find out whether the 
IndyMac loan modifications that were initiated directly by the FDIC performed any differently from loan modifications 
initiated by private lenders.
10. For further description and discussion of HAMP, see Cordell et al. (2009).
11. According to the Servicer Performance Report Through January 2010, there have been 116,000 permanent modifications 
plus 76,000 approved by servicers and pending borrower acceptance. 
HAMP applies to borrowers who are current on their mortgage payments and have a stable income sufficient to 
support the new mortgage payment. Eligible loans include those owned or controlled by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac 
where the first mortgage does not exceed 105 percent of the current market value of the property. The program 
replaces an adjustable-rate mortgage and initial-interest mortgage or balloon/reset mortgage with a fifteen-, twenty-, 
or thirty-year fixed-rate mortgage. Refinanced mortgages cannot be used to pay off or reduce subordinate liens. In 
addition, cash cannot be taken out. According to the Treasury, through December 2009, this program has allowed more 
than 3.8 million borrowers to refinance, saving an estimated $150 per month on average and more than $6.8 billion in 
total over the first year.7 E C O N O M I C   R E V I E W   Number 2, 2010
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the situation in which a delinquent borrower is able to solve the issues that led to delinquency in 
the first place and repay the entire amount of the loan without any assistance from the lender. 
The idea is that if self-cure risk is high, then the lender incurs unnecessary costs of assisting 
borrowers who would have cured anyway. We will talk about self-cure risk in more detail below, but 
to illustrate its potential importance in loss mitigation decisions, we draw the reader’s attention to 
this quote from Capone (1996): “Industry sources suggest that 70–80 percent of all loans arriving at 
90-days delinquency can still reinstate without assistance.” Of course, such statistics are extremely 
sensitive to the economic environment, but this quote illustrates that such concerns are not trivial. 
Riddiough and Wyatt (1994b) was the first paper to analyze the foreclosure versus the 
renegotiation decision in a strategic environment, in which lenders in the residential mortgage 
market hold private information regarding their costs of completing a foreclosure.12 This private 
information plays an important role because of the large average magnitude of foreclosure costs 
and the heterogeneity of costs across lenders. In the model, the lender’s decision to renegotiate or 
foreclose on a given borrower acts as a signal of the lender’s foreclosure costs to other borrowers 
who are considering default. Thus, a lender must be cognizant of the reputation that it forms 
from previous decisions regarding foreclosure and renegotiation. If, for example, a lender has 
historically given borrowers generous concessions in the form of favorable loan modifications, 
then borrowers currently in financial duress, having observed this past behavior, will infer high 
foreclosure costs associated with the lender. In such a scenario, borrowers may have an incentive 
to strategically default to gain concessions from the lender, whereas the same borrowers might 
not default if they had to negotiate with a lender that was less generous and thus perceived to 
have lower foreclosure costs. 
Wang, Young, and Zhou (2002), building on the work of Riddiough and Wyatt, argue that the 
existence of asymmetric information between a borrower and lender implies that it is optimal for 
the lender to randomly reject requests for concessionary modifications. Their model is composed 
of a single lender (a bank) and two types of borrowers: financially distressed borrowers who 
will default with certainty unless the lender is willing to provide concessions and nondistressed 
borrowers who may be tempted to default because they have negative equity but who do not 
because of high default costs. The nondistressed borrowers can request a modification from the 
lender but must pay a cost to do so. The lender can distinguish between the two borrower types 
only by screening. The screening technology is assumed to be perfect but costly. Thus, the lender 
has two tools at its disposal to limit the number of nondistressed borrower applications. It can 
either pay a screening cost to identify borrowers with certainty, or it can use a random rejection 
policy,  which  is  costless  but  has  the  disadvantage  of  rejecting  distressed  and  nondistressed 
borrowers with equal probability. Wang, Young, and Zhou show that in such a model, the lender’s 
optimal policy always takes one of two forms. A lender will either randomly reject applicants 
without any screening (which happens when the screening cost is sufficiently large) or will accept 
all applications but will screen enough applicants to completely deter nondistressed borrowers 
from applying (which happens when the screening cost is relatively low). The lender’s optimal 
random rejection rate depends on the cost of liquidation, the magnitude of the default benefit to 
the borrower, the fraction of distressed borrowers in the population, and the size of the application 
cost that must be incurred by a nondistressed borrower. 
A random rejection policy for modification applications may seem to be extremely abstract 
and unrealistic, but through various methods, lenders may be able to effectively approximate 
such a policy. For example, a lender could purposefully understaff its calling center so that many 
calls by borrowers seeking assistance go unanswered. There have been many anecdotes over the 
course of the current foreclosure crisis of understaffing on the part of mortgage servicers and 
12. According to Cutts and Green (2005), these costs include the opportunity cost of principal and income not received, 
servicing costs, legal costs, property maintenance costs, and costs associated with property disposition.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA
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thus the inability of many borrowers to communicate directly with their servicer. Of course, this 
situation may simply reflect certain mortgage servicers’ inability to forecast the extent of mortgage 
delinquencies rather than a conscious decision to ignore a fraction of borrowers, but the fact that 
such anecdotes continue to appear in the media at such an advanced stage of the crisis makes us 
at least a little skeptical. 
Finally, it is worth noting that these models are all static, and thus expectations of future 
market conditions do not play a role in the equilibrium outcomes. In reality, the borrower’s default 
decision and the lender’s decision to foreclose or renegotiate are dynamic decisions that depend 
importantly on such expectations. Foote et al. (2009) develop a very simple, stylized model of 
the borrower’s decision to default and point out that a higher probability of future house price 
appreciation increases the expected return of not defaulting on the mortgage and staying in the 
house. Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen (2009) develop a simple model of the lender’s decision to 
foreclose or modify and show that future house price appreciation affects the gains to modification. 
If lenders expect house prices to fall in the future and modification redefault rates are high, then 
they may prefer to forgo renegotiation and foreclose immediately rather than have to foreclose on 
a significant number of borrowers at a later date when house prices are even lower. 
Empirical literature. With the housing downturn and the huge increase in foreclosures 
nationwide,  the  issue  of  loss  mitigation—and,  in  particular,  loan  modification—has  become  a 
topic of interest in the recent mortgage literature. Numerous academics and policymakers (both 
in the field of economics and in the field of law) have taken the view that lenders (through the 
mortgage servicers that they pay to collect and process mortgage payments) are foreclosing on 
an inefficiently large number of borrowers.13 These authors note that the process of foreclosing 
on a borrower is typically very costly, both because of the time costs involved as well as the direct 
monetary costs incurred, which include maintenance and depreciation costs, tax payments, and 
real estate agent fees. In addition, the servicer typically resells a foreclosed property for much 
less than the outstanding balance on the mortgage. Thus, on the surface, it would appear that the 
lender would be better off taking a small loss to modify the loan of a seriously delinquent borrower 
as opposed to refusing a modification and initiating the costly process of foreclosure. 
So what could possibly explain this puzzling behavior on the part of lenders and servicers 
of offering few concessionary modifications to distressed borrowers and choosing, instead, in 
most situations, the costly process of foreclosure? As we discussed briefly above, perhaps the 
most prevalent explanation for this behavior is the existence of contract frictions and misaligned 
incentives in the institutional structure of MBSs, which renders renegotiation between borrowers 
and MBS investors prohibitively costly. The estimates of the deadweight losses that result from 
these  frictions  are  extremely  high.14  Those  who  blame  securitization  for  the  low  number  of 
modifications point to at least two culprits. The first is the pooling and service agreements (PSAs) 
that govern the behavior of mortgage servicers in securitization trusts. Some PSAs directly specify 
and restrict the latitude that servicers have when deciding between modification and foreclosure. 
As a general rule, these PSAs allow servicers to modify loans but only in cases where imminent 
default is deemed to be likely and where the benefit of a modification over foreclosure can be 
shown with a net present value (NPV) calculation.15 Second, those who blame securitization claim 
that servicers may not modify many loans for fear of being sued by investors in one tranche of 
13. See, for example, Eggert (2007), Geanakoplos and Koniak (2008), Levitin (2009a, b), White (2008), and the Congressional 
Oversight Panel of the Troubled Assets Relief Program (2009).
14. Foote et al. (2009) use figures from the FDIC and White (2009) to arrive at an estimated total deadweight loss of 
approximately $180 billion. However, the authors are skeptical of such an estimate and refer to the predictions of the 
Coase theorem in their arguments.
15. Hunt (2009) looked at a number of subprime MBS contracts and found that outright bans on modifications were rare 
and that most of the contracts that allowed modifications basically instructed the servicer to behave as if it were the 
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the MBS even if modifying as opposed to foreclosing would benefit the investors in the trust as 
a whole. Since investors in the various tranches have different claims to the cash flows from the 
MBS, a modification could alter the flows in a way that would benefit one tranche at the expense 
of another.16 Thus, there may be enough ambiguity in the PSAs to make servicers wary of getting 
caught up in so-called tranche warfare, which may provide servicers an incentive to follow the path 
of least resistance and foreclose on seriously delinquent borrowers.17 
In response to such concerns, Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen (2009) and Piskorski, Seru, and 
Vig (2009) conducted empirical studies using microdata on a nationally representative sample of 
mortgages that sought to either confirm or deny the presence of 
frictions in the securitization process that could impede efficient 
levels  of  renegotiation  activity.  While  both  of  these  studies 
use the same data set (Lender Processing Services [LPS]) to 
compare securitized mortgages to mortgages that are held in 
the originator’s own portfolio and are not sold in the secondary 
market, the studies come to completely different conclusions. 
Piskorski, Seru, and Vig find relatively large differences in 
foreclosure rates between securitized mortgages and loans held in the originator’s portfolio. Since 
portfolio-held loans, which are usually serviced in-house by the lender, in theory do not suffer from 
the same types of contract frictions and misaligned incentives that potentially plague securitized 
mortgages, the authors interpret this difference as evidence that frictions in the securitization 
process hinder the renegotiation process and create a bias toward foreclosure. They estimate 
the difference in foreclosure rates as between 3.8 percent and 7.0 percent in absolute terms 
(depending on the specific vintage) and between 18 percent and 32 percent in relative terms. The 
authors state in their conclusion: “As banks are likely to fully internalize the costs and benefits 
of the decision to foreclose a delinquent loan, it is natural to interpret our results as suggesting 
that securitization has imposed renegotiation frictions that have resulted in higher foreclosure 
rates than would be desired by investors.” While Piskorski, Seru, and Vig do discuss alternative 
interpretations that would also be consistent with their findings, policymakers and analysts have 
pointed to their study as evidence confirming that securitization is to blame for a large part of the 
foreclosure crisis. For example, in congressional testimony on February 3, 2009, Edward Morrison, 
a professor at Columbia Law School, said, “Recent research shows that when these mortgages 
become delinquent, servicers opt for foreclosure over mortgage modification much more often 
than private lenders who service their own mortgages,” and he cites the Piskorski, Seru, and Vig 
paper in an accompanying footnote. 
Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen (2009) focus on loan modification rates as opposed to foreclosure 
rates and find small differences in the modification rates of securitized mortgages compared to portfolio 
loans.18 The differences they find are sensitive to the particular sample but are rarely more than 10 
percent in relative terms, which, when combined with the extremely low level of modification rates 
for both types of loans (less than 5 percent), translates into economically insignificant magnitudes. 
16. If this is in fact a significant impediment to renegotiation, it is a bit puzzling as to why market participants would not 
have foreseen this issue and dealt with it in the PSAs. However, it is certainly possible that the PSAs were not written 
with an eye to the current housing and foreclosure crisis.
17. Yet another potential friction to renegotiation that has been raised is the prevalence of second liens. A popular alternative 
to obtaining a single high-LTV loan with private mortgage insurance (necessary to qualify for a GSE guarantee) was 
to obtain two mortgages, with the first having an LTV of 80 percent and the second an LTV between 5 and 20 percent. 
These second liens are often referred to as “piggybacks.” Some market observers believe that the presence of second 
liens may be impeding renegotiation and other foreclosure prevention efforts. However, to our knowledge there is 
very little empirical analysis on this topic, and the foreclosure prevention programs discussed above do not explicitly 
address this issue.
18. Both the Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen and Piskorski, Seru, and Vig studies control for numerous borrower and mortgage 
characteristics.
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The authors interpret their findings as evidence that securitization is not playing a significant role 
in impeding efficient levels of renegotiation in the mortgage market. They state: “We document that 
servicers have been reluctant to renegotiate mortgages since the foreclosure crisis started in 2007, 
having performed payment reducing modifications on only about 3 percent of seriously delinquent 
loans. We show that this reluctance does not result from securitization: servicers renegotiate similarly 
small fractions of loans that they hold in their portfolios.” 
So  the  natural  question  then  becomes,  if  securitization  is 
not to blame for the extremely low levels of loan modifications, 
compared to foreclosures, that have characterized the current 
housing crisis, what is to blame?19 Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen 
point to various issues in the lender’s decision to renegotiate with 
a borrower, which, when accounted for, substantially raise the 
costs of renegotiation. In a simple theoretical model of mortgage 
modification, they find that self-cure risk, redefault risk, and the 
issue of asymmetric information between the lender and the borrower could substantially increase 
the cost of providing concessionary modifications to a borrower and could thus severely limit lenders’ 
willingness to renegotiate with distressed borrowers rather than to initiate foreclosure proceedings. 
In their sample of mortgages that covers the period from early 2005 through 2008, Adelino, 
Gerardi, and Willen find that more than 30 percent of seriously delinquent borrowers recover and 
become current on their mortgage (or “cure”) without receiving a loan modification. 20 If we take 
this number at face value and assume that a lender were to provide a concessionary modification 
to all of its seriously delinquent borrowers, then approximately 30 percent of the money spent by 
the lender in such an endeavor (that is, the reduced interest and/or principal payments) would 
be essentially wasted. In addition to finding relatively high self-cure rates in the data, Adelino, 
Gerardi, and Willen also find high redefault rates. They find that between 20 percent and 50 percent 
of modified mortgages (depending on the specific sample) end up back in serious delinquency 
within six months. Given the short horizon, these percentages are very high, implying that for a 
large fraction of borrowers, the lender is simply postponing foreclosure. This strategy is costly in 
an environment of low sales volume and declining prices since it means that lenders will recover 
even less in foreclosure. Furthermore, a borrower who faces a high likelihood of eventually being 
evicted will have little incentive to maintain the house (and may even make things worse), which 
will also reduce a lender’s expected recovery in foreclosure. 
Finally, in another paper, Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen (2010a) discuss the issue of asymmetric 
information, which was at the heart of the previous literature on mortgage modification in the 
1990s. Riddiough and Wyatt (1994a) modeled asymmetric information from the perspective of 
the borrower since lenders hold private information regarding their costs of foreclosure. Wang, 
Young, and Zhou (2002) instead posit that borrowers hold private information with respect to their 
plans to default since some borrowers are truly financially distressed and in imminent danger of 
defaulting, while others have no plans to default and are simply pretending to be distressed in order 
to obtain a modification.21 Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen’s model is similar in spirit to Wang, Young, 
19. See Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen (2010b) for a detailed explanation and reconciliation of the differences between their 
2009 study and Piskorski, Seru, and Vig (2009).
20. Seriously delinquent borrowers are defined as those who are at least sixty days delinquent on their mortgage (having 
missed at least two payments).
21. The issue of moral hazard in the context of borrowers strategically defaulting in order to qualify for modifications 
has also been discussed in other papers. Foote et al. (2009) is one recent example. In addition, Riddiough and Wyatt 
(1994a) provide an extensive discussion and analysis of the moral hazard problem associated with pursuing workouts 
rather  than  foreclosures  for  the  commercial  mortgage  market.  Their  analysis  suggests  that  lenders  will  consider 
foreclosure alternatives only when the cost of foreclosing is higher than the cost of revealing information concerning 
the true foreclosure costs to other borrowers and thus encouraging additional defaults.
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and Zhou but differs substantially in the particular details. Their model is basically equivalent 
to a monopoly pricing problem, in which, instead of a price, the lender is deciding which profit-
maximizing modification to offer borrowers. The lender has monopoly power in this case because 
the mortgage is an exclusive contract between the borrower and the lender, and the lender always 
has the option to foreclose on the borrower. In their model, there is a single lender who holds the 
mortgages of a group of borrowers. Each borrower has a reservation value of default, whereby a 
modification (in the form of principal write-down) offered that is greater than the reservation value 
will prevent the borrower from defaulting right away, while a borrower with a reservation value 
lower than the modification offered will default immediately. In the case of perfect information, 
where the lender knows each borrower’s reservation value, there is perfect discrimination since 
the lender offers each borrower his/her reservation value as long as that value is below the cost of 
liquidation. Assuming perfect information, no redefault risk, and a cost of foreclosure (liquidation) 
to the lender that is higher than the maximum reservation value among the group of borrowers, 
there is no foreclosure in equilibrium. 
In the case of asymmetric information, however, the lender does not know each reservation 
value but does know the distribution of reservation values across its borrowers. Thus, the lender 
can no longer discriminate and must offer the same modification to all of its eligible borrowers. 
Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen assume that a fraction of the lender’s borrowers are not eligible for 
a modification because of a high cost of applying and becoming eligible for a modification.22 In 
the first scenario, the authors assume that this group of ineligible borrowers is independent of 
the modification offered by the lender. Under this scenario, the authors show that if the lender 
offers a modification (which depends on liquidation costs, redefault risk, and self-cure risk), the 
modification that maximizes the lender’s profits is roughly the average of the reservation values 
of the eligible pool of borrowers, adjusted (downward) for self-cure risk and redefault risk. Since 
borrowers with reservation values above the modification default, with asymmetric information 
the incidence of foreclosure is quite high. In a second scenario, the authors allow the size of the 
eligible pool of borrowers to depend on the size of the modification the lender offers. Specifically, 
as the size of the modification increases, more borrowers decide to become eligible (by missing 
mortgage payments, for example). The lender internalizes this effect when deciding on the optimal 
modification to offer to borrowers, and the authors show that this effect reduces the size of the 
optimal modification. This scenario corresponds to a situation of moral hazard, in which borrowers 
have an incentive (receiving the modification) to take hidden action, which increases the costs to 
the lender of offering modifications.23 
Asymmetric information can explain why the calculations performed by White (2009) are 
perfectly consistent with the extremely low levels of modification activity found by Adelino, Gerardi, 
and Willen (2009). The calculation simply compares the cost of liquidation with the average level 
of modification offered by lenders and implies that because the cost of liquidation is so much 
higher (seven times), lenders are acting irrationally. Lenders can only segment borrowers based 
on observable characteristics (that is, FICO scores at origination, LTV, DTI ratios at origination), 
and thus the optimal modification will only be a function of those observable characteristics. But 
we know that even conditioning on observable characteristics, there are large differences across 
borrowers due to characteristics that are unobserved by lenders and servicers, especially with 
respect to default propensities. Thus, the lender will have to offer the same modification terms to 
22. Intuitively, this group corresponds to borrowers who are financially sound and not delinquent on their mortgages. 
Many of the current modification programs have eligibility requirements that include being seriously delinquent on the 
mortgage. Thus, for financially sound borrowers who are current on their mortgages, missing a number of mortgage 
payments to qualify for a modification would be quite costly in terms of the impact on credit scores and, hence, access 
to future credit.
23. Mulligan (2008) also addresses this issue with respect to the effect of means-tested modification programs on optimal 
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these borrowers. In such an environment, lenders could increase the generosity of the modification 
in order to try and prevent foreclosing on borrowers with higher reservation values, but at the 
same time, they will have to offer the more generous modification to the borrowers with lower 
reservation values for whom a lower modification would suffice. This practice decreases profits 
to the lender. Moral hazard makes things even worse as the lender recognizes that by offering 
more generous modifications, borrowers who have no plans to default will have the incentive to 
gain eligibility and qualify for the modification, further decreasing expected profits. Thus, with 
asymmetric information, self-cure risk, and redefault risk, the profit-maximizing modification the 
lender offers will be significantly lower than the average liquidation cost. These same reasons, 
along with uncertain future house price movements, also underscore the lackluster performance 
of the various government loan modification programs to date. 
Conclusion
In this article we have discussed the various loss mitigation tools available to borrowers and lenders in 
the mortgage market and have summarized the academic literature on these tools. We have focused 
most of the discussion on loan modifications because these have received the most attention both in 
the literature and in policy circles. The Obama administration’s primary focus thus far has been on 
trying to save as many homeowners from foreclosure as possible by attempting to convince lenders 
to voluntarily modify their delinquent loans. By most counts, this policy has achieved limited success, 
and as a result it is likely that policymakers will turn their attention to other alternatives as the 
foreclosure crisis continues to take its toll on the U.S. economy. 
Numerous other loss mitigation proposals have been put forth by various academic scholars 
and industry insiders in recent months. For example, a couple of intriguing proposals—Davis, 
Malpezzi, and Ortalo-Magné’s (2009) WI-FUR plan and the Boston Fed plan (Foote, Fuhrer et al. 
2009)—can be interpreted as providing substantial but temporary assistance to borrowers in 
financial distress because of job loss. The details of these plans differ, but the main idea is to 
temporarily subsidize the monthly mortgage payments of involuntarily unemployed households 
until reemployment occurs or the maximum number of months of eligibility in the plan is reached 
(fifteen months for the Boston Fed plan and two years for the WI-FUR plan). These plans are not 
permanent modifications of the mortgage contracts since the payment subsidy is temporary. In 
addition, depending on the plan, some borrowers would be required to pay back the subsidy at a 
later date. One of the potentially big advantages of these plans is that they would be able to use the 
existing infrastructure of unemployment insurance, which would keep the administrative costs and 
monitoring costs to relatively low levels. In addition, the asymmetric information issues discussed 
in detail above would likely be limited since to qualify for these plans a borrower would need to be 
enrolled in the unemployment insurance program and thus would need to have experienced a job 
loss (rather than simply missing a few mortgage payments). 
While it is unclear what the best loss mitigation tool is in practice, what is clear is that 
the foreclosure crisis continues to depress the housing market and the overall economy, and 
policymakers must find a way to mitigate its effects if the economy is to experience a robust 
recovery. For almost two years now, most efforts have focused on loan modification programs. 
There are signs that this focus is now shifting to other types of foreclosure-prevention programs 
and to programs that do not attempt to prevent foreclosures but rather try to help the millions of 
homeowners who have already experienced foreclosure make the transition to a new home and a 
new lifestyle. 13 E C O N O M I C   R E V I E W   Number 2, 2010
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